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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NORTHERN DIVISION 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR. , ) 
ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, 
DONALD S. COHEN, ) 
THE AUDUBON COUNCIL OF TENNESSEE, INC., 
~d ) 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEASTERN BIOLOGISTS 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CIVIL ACTION 
NO. 3-76-48 
POST-TRIAL BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS, HIRM1 G. 
HILL, JR., ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, DONALDS. COHEN, 
AUDUBON COUNCIL OF TENNESSEE, and ASSOCIATION OF 
SOUTHEASTERN BIOLOGISTS 
r' 
As the Court recognizes, this litigation presents intri~' 
ii cate questions of biological fact, public policy and Congressional: 
: i ~ 
mandate. These have been articulated at great leng.th in the 
course of trial. The questions of law in the case, on the other 
. hand, are straightforward and need not be repeated at length. 
Since the case to date includes extensive testimony and 
a multiplicity of documents, plaintiffs take this opportunity 
to summarize the case and to present several new authorities men-
tioned at trial but not previously briefed to the Court. To 
avoid duplication this brief is a suppl~ent rather than a substi-
tute for plaintiff's prior briefs. 
Section I herein is an outline summary of plaintiffs' 
1
1 case, with references to authority in the various trial briefs. 
,\ 
" 
Section II develops several new arguments establishing 
· the violation of the Endangered Species Act. 
Section III develops further authority supporting the 
• issuance of the permanent injunction and remand to Congress. 
Section IV is a brief conclusion. 
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I. Summ.ary of the Case 
'A. BIOLOGICAL FACTS 
I• 
I' 
1. The snail darter, Percina (Imostoma) tanasi, exists 
and is an endangered species. 
This proposition(Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 41 now appears 
to be accepted by all parties. 
The Department of Interior's listing appears in 40 Fed. 
Reg. 47505. At trial, this and subsequent biological 
facts in this section were established by Dr. Ramsey, Dr. 
Etnier, Dr. Suttkus, Wayne Starnes and several TVA wit-
nesses. 
2. The Little Tennessee River is critical habitat for 
the snail darter. 
Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 4. 
Department of Interior rule, 41 Fed. Reg. 13927. Though 
individual specimens have been found elsewhere, the Little 
Tennessee is the only known established population, 
numbering 10,000 or more individuals. "[A]ny other critical 
areas found subsequent to this rulemaking will be proposed 
and published in the Federal Register. " 41 Fed. Reg. 
13928. 
3. Construction of the reservoir portion of the Tellico 
Project would jeopardize the existence of the species, 
destroy .or adversely modify the critical habitat, and 
eliminate the species in the Little Tennessee River. 
Plaintiffs Trial Brief, 10-ll. 
40 Fed. Reg. 47506: "The proposed impoundment of water 
behind the proposed Tellico Dam would result in total 
destruction of the snail darter's habitat." Testimony at 
trial established that the reservoir would make major 
changes in the size, quality and current of the Little 
Tennessee, and change the silt free character of the river 
bottom itself and the nature of the benthic organisms that 
currently exist there. This would also result in a high 
probability of eliminating the darters now existing in 
the reservoir. 
4. The transplant program may or may not succeed; other 
established populations may or may not be determined. 
Brief at 11. 
. ·' .~ 
. B. 
I 
l 
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If conclusive evidence were found for either proposition, 
such sites themselves would become critical habitat sub-
ject to the Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 13928, and the Little 
Tennessee River population would still remain fully pro-
tected by the Act. See letter from Assistant Secretary 
Reed to Professor Zygmunt Plater, April 27, 1976 at 3. 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT APPLIES TO THE TELLICO PROJECT 
l. There is no implied exemption for ongoing projects 
in the Act. 
Plaintiffs Trial Brief at 6-10. 
Citing this Court and the majority rule in other federal 
courts, etc. 
2. Continued appropriations do not create an exemption. 
Brief at 8-9; Section II(B) herein. ~f~ -d f· 2 0) 
•C. THE TELLICO RESERVOIR VIOLATES THE ACT 
!: 
' 
I' 
l. The Reservoir will jeopardize the species' existence, 
destroy or modiLy habitat, and harm the present popu-
lation of the darter. 
Brief at 10-12; Section II(C} herein, noting the elements 
of a violation of §7 and §9 of the Act; see Biological 
Facts, supra, §A; new authority on §9, see infra II. 
D. WHERE THE ACT IS VIOLATED AN INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE 
l. U.S. Supreme Court holdings in cases of statutory 
violation establish such a principle for the exercise 
of equitable discretion . 
Brief at 13; new authority at Section III (l) herein. 
2. Prior Endangered Species Act cases support that 
principle. 
Brief at 13, discussing Coleman (Sandhill Crane Case); 
Coleman's construction supported by recent Froehlke case, 
Supplementary Brief 3-8. 
i' 
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3. The Congressional priority of the Act over public 
works projects supports the principle. 
Brief at 12-13 .. 
4. Federal cases on point support the principle·-- both 
environmental cases and others. 
Brief at 13-15; new authority at Section III (4) herein. 
5. A remand to Congress via an injunction lS the proper 
disposition of public works violations of an Act of 
Congress. 
Brief at 14-15; new authority at Section III (5) herein. 
6. By remanding to Congress the Court avoids entering 
the political arena and the subjective balancing of 
unquantifiable legislative policy and economic values. 
Brief at 16, 19-20; new authority at Section III (6) 
herein. 
7. The Administrative Procedure Act compels issU:anc.e of 
an injunction. 
6 USC §706, at Section III (7) herein. 
8. There is a presumption in favor of enforcement of the 
Act, and against the party seeking to continue a 
violation of the Act. 
Supplementary Brief at l-2. 
II. Further Discussion of Violations 
of the Endangered Species Act 
·A. No Implied Statutory Exemption For Ongoing Projects 
Plaintiff has previously briefed the question of the appli-
cation of the Endangered Species Act to a project begun prior to 
!) 
il 
the effective date of the Act. Brief, 6-9. The proposed Depart-
ment of the Interior "Guidelines To Assist Federal Agencies In 
I ' 
5 
Complying With Section 7 Of The Endangered Species Act Of 1973" 
i support this Court's preliminary indication that the Endangered 
Species Act was intended to apply to such projects. These guide-
lines are included as an attachment to Secretary Reed's.letter to 
'Professor Plater dated April 27, 1976. Section I-D reads as 
::follows: 
I, 
' ,. 
i 
.I 
I 
" 
D. Application of Section 7 to Existing Activities and 
Programs 
1. In considering whether section 7 applies 
to actions in the planning, review, or im-
plementation stage but not completed prior 
to December 28, 1973, Federal agencies 
should determine if the action is ... (2) 
one being undertaken by or on.behalf of a 
Federal entity and substantial work re-
mains to be done which would, independent 
of the effect of earlier work performed, 
in and of itself jeopqrdize the continued 
existence of a listed species or modify 
or destroy critical habitat of a listed 
species. If the Federal presence and 
control remains to be felt, the Federal 
decision remains to be made, or such work 
on a Federal project remains to be per-
formed, then the requirements of section 
7 should be satisfied. 
2. The requirements of section 7 shall be. 
applied to activities and programs of 
Federal agencies presently in progre~s and 
initiated on or after December 28, 1973, 
that could affect listed species or their 
habitats. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority itself stated that substan-
,:tial work remains to be performed on the Tellico Project. The 
requirements of Section 7 must, therefore, be satisfied since the 
'closure of Tellico Dam will affect a listed species and its habi-
1 
tat. 
:B. No Implied Exemption By Appropriations Acts 
Plaintiffs have already addressed defendant's argument 
,that Congress' continued appropriations indicate its tacit ap-
,proval of the Tellico Project regardless of Endangered Species 
i'Act violations. Brief, 9-10. As previously noted, the matter 
,, 
was never debated on the floor of Congress, so that no appropria-
6 
.tion vote was cast by any legislator with full knowledge that an 
endangered species would be eliminated by the closing of the 
.dam. In addition, Chairman Aubrey Wagner's comments to the House 
,i Sub-Committee on appropriations, noted in TVA's brief, were made 
• well before the snail darter was ever listed as endangered or 
1'its habitat designated as critical. Full consideration of the En-
,idangered Species Act could never have been given by Congress prior 
·' 
to the appropriations' being made. In an earlier brief, plain-
tiff has cited authority to the effect that an appropriations 
act cannot serve as a statement that a project may be completed 
despite violations of federal law. Congress must retain the 
,flexibility to fund or refuse to fund projects without consider-
' 
1[ing federal violations. The existence or nonexistence of a vio-
lation of federal law is a question for the courts which Congress 1 
does not address in its deliberations . 
. Defendants' major authority on this point, EDF v. Corps 
·of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (TVA brief at 19), does not support 
:1 their position. It was not a case implying a statutory exemp-
,. 
:tion frpm appropriations, but rather merely affirmed the principle 
:that courts will not review a cost-benefit ratio per se once 
Congress has accepted it via an appropriation. See, e.g., EDF 
v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) . 
. C. Elements of the Violation of Section 7 and Section 9 
The evidence at trial has clearly established that a vio-
· lation of both Section 7 (15 U.S.C. §1536) and Section 9 (U.S.C. 
:'§1538) will occur when the Tellico Dam is closed. The testimony 
of Drs. Etnier, Ramsey, Williams, Suttkus, Beauschung, and Mr. 
Starnes firmly indicates that the closure of the Tellico Dam 
::will jeopardize the continued existence of the snail darter and 
will result in the destruction or modification of the critical 
:habitat of the snail darter. Defendant has offered no credible 
evidence to dispute these conclusions. 
7 
In addition, as this Court knows, §1538 of the Endangered 
•Species Act makes it unlawful for a federal agency to "take any 
[endangered] species within the United States ... ~ Plaintiffs 
,have introduced into evidence regulations published in the Federal 
Register, Vol. 40, No. 188, on Friday, September 26, 1975, which 
clarify the definition of "take".which appears in 16 U.S.C. §1532 
(14) as including "harass" or "harm". These clarifications up-
:idate regulations published 1n July of 1975 and read as follows: 
"Harass" in the definition of "take" in the 
Act means an intentional or negligent act or 
omission which creates the likelihood of injury 
to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as 
to signifigantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns 
which include, but are not limited to, breeding, 
feeding, or sheltering. 
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the 
Act means an act or omission which actually 
injures o~ kills wildlife, including acts which 
annoy it to such an extent as to significantly 
disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which in-
clude, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding 
or sheltering; significant environmental modi-
fication or degradation which has such effects 
is included within the meaning of "harm". 
The testimony has demonstrated that the closure of Tellico 
.Dam and the consequent impoundment of the Little Tepnessee River 
1 will render the snail darter extinct, or at very least, modify 
its critical habitat. There was extensive testimony on the 
effects the impoundment would have on the reproduction and feed.:.. 
:ing and sheltering processes of the snail darter. The conse-
quences of the closure would obviously disrupt these essential 
·behavioral patterns and would certainly constitute significant 
:.environmental modification which has the effect of significantly 
disrupting breeding, feeding, or sheltering. Defendant has offered 
no credible testimony to dispute this. 
It should be noted that it is not only the determination 
•by the Department of the Interior that the snail darter is en-
!dangered and the designation of the Little Tennessee River as its 
- critical habitat that firmly supports the evidence adduced at 
8 
trial concerning the violation of Sections 7 and 9. The letter 
'from Nathaniel Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for 
Fish and Wildlife and Parks to Professor Plater, dated April 27, 
1976, reiterates the Department of the Interior's strong stand 
· .. on this question. Comments on pages two. and three of that 
;I 
letter referring to earlier correspondence from Interior to TVA 
indicate clearly the Department's conclusions that: 
"The proposed impoundment of water behind the 
proposed Tellico Dam would result in total de-
struction of the snail darter's habitat. 
It has been determined by Fish and Wildlife 
Service biologists that this fish would become 
extinct if the Tellico Dam Project of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority is completed. 
The extensive fact-finding which preceeded our 
determination of the endangered status of this 
fish substantiates, in our opinion, the conten-
tion that your agency's Tellico Dam Project, 
if continued as presently planned, will result 
in destruction of the eco-system upon which this 
endangered species depends. This undoubtedly will 
result in extinction of the established natural 
populations of this species, a result obviously 
contrary to the policies and purposes of the Act . 
... Closing of the Dam and filling of the 
reservoir . . . constitutes the ac:t:ion which 
in our opinion will ultimately jeopardize the 
continued existence of the Snail Darter undoubted-
ly destroying the existing established population 
of the species .... The proposed Tellico Dam 
would result in total destruction of the sna'il 
darter's habitat .... The reservoir would elimi-
nate the only known population of the snail darter, 
rendering the species extinct .... Available 
scientific evidence indicates that the TVA Tellico 
Project, if completed as planned, will destroy 
the snail darter in its only known location." 
D. Transplantation and Other Alleged Snail Darter Populations 
Defendants have addressed the substance of their proof 
to the questions of the transplantation of snail darters into 
.the Hiwassee River and to the alleged existence of fewer than a 
,dozen snail darters in Watts Bar and Chicamauga Reservoirs. As 
,this Court well knows, the Endangered Species Conservation Act 
I 
·'of 1969, 16 U.S.C. 668 aa-cc, required that in order for a sp~cies 
I i 
to be protected that it be "threatened with world wide extinction." 
16 U.S.C. §2. As this Court also knows, the 1973 Act defines 
9 
"endangered species" as "any species which is in danger of ex-
tinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range. 
" 16 u.s.c. §1532 (4). Congress clearly intended that a 
species did not have to be reduced to the last bastion of its 
existence in order to be protected under the 1973 Act. Congress 
intended that remedial action be taken before a species was 
,eliminated 1n all but its last refuge. 
The evidence offered by TVA to establish that a viable, 
reproducing population of snail darters exists in the Hiwassee 
River, Watts Bar Reservoir, or Chicamauga Reservoir was ex-
tremely speculative~ Even if this evidence were persuasive, 
however, a violation of the Act would still exist. A significant 
portion of the range of the snail darter would still exist in 
the Little Tennessee River and be destroyed by the closing of 
the dam. Defendant's experts did not dispute this. In addition, 
the habitat critical to the survival of the snail darter in the 
Little Tennessee River would still be. modified or destroyed by 
the impoundment of the River in January of 1977. Defendant's 
evidence on these points is, therefore, essentially, irrelevant 
to the 1973 Act. This is confirmed by Assistant Secretary 
Reed's April 27, 1976 letter to Professor Plater: 
Recent assertions that the snail darter exists 
elsewhere than in that portion of the Little 
Tennessee River declared to be critical habitat 
do nothing to change the Service's position. The 
biological evidence remains that if the Little 
Tennessee River is impounded by Tellico Dam, 
the continued existence of the snail darter 
will be jeopardized and its critical habitat 
destroyed. 
E. Mandatory Standard for Compliance With the 1973 Act - Irrele-
vancy of Evidence of Good Faith and the Arbitrary and Capr1cious.· 
Test 
Part of defendant's case was directed toward establishing 
the proposition that good faith, reasonable efforts to comply 
with the Endangered Species Act of 1973 would be sufficient to 
10 
avoid a violation of it. A brief examination of the language of 
the Act, the legislative history, and the cases which have 
been decided under the Act indicates that Section 7 imposes a 
mandatory duty rather than merely a duty to make reasonable 
efforts to comply. 
The trial court in National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman 
based its decision in part on the fact that defendants had "not 
been callous in their planning" and had "adequately considered 
the effects of the project on the crane. " The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court ruling 
and held the federal agency there involved to a very strict stan-
dard of compliance with the Endangered Species Act. Attaching 
great significance to Interior's determination of critical habi-
tat, the Court stated that " §7 imposes on federal agencies 
,the mandatory duty to insure that their actions will not either 
(i) jeopardize the existence of an endangered species, or (ii) 
destroy or modify critical habitat of an endangered species." 
p. 2569 (emphasis added) . Emphasizing the mandatory nature of 
the Act, the Court quoted the House Report on the Act: "'This 
subsection ... requires that agencies take the necessary action 
that will not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered 
species or result in the destruction of critical habitat of those 
species.' H. Rep. No. 93-412, 94th Cong., lst Sess.," p. 2569, 
fn. l 7. 
In addressing the standard for compliance, the 5th Circuit 
found the "adequately considered" standard under which the trial 
court considered the 1973 Act, to be a misinterpretation of the 
requirements of the Act. The Court said at page 2571: 
In holding that the appellees have "adequately 
considered" the effects of the highway on the 
crane, the district court misconstrued the 
directive of §7 which imposes on all federal 
agencies the mandatory obligation to insure that 
any action authorized, funded, or carried out 
by them does not jeopardize the existence of an 
ll 
endangered species or destroy critical habitat 
of such species. Although the FEIS and the admin-
istrative record indicates that the appellees 
have recognized and considered the danger the 
highway poses to the crane, they have failed 
to take the necessary steps "to insure" that 
the highway will not jeopardize the crane or 
modify its habitat. 
'Plaintiff's trial brief has already demonstrated that the recent 
Eighth Circuit opinion in Sierra Club v. Froehlke has also sup-
,,ported the mandatory nature of this provision of the Endangered 
Species Act. 
Other factors also dictate a strict compliance standard 
; for Section 7. First, the language of the Act itself is clearly 
!( 
non-discretionary in nature: 
All other Federal Dept. and agencies shall, ... 
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs 
for the conservation of endangered species ... 
and by taking such action necessary to insure 
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out 
by them do not jeopardize the continued existence 
of such endangered species ... or result in the 
destruction or modification of habitat of such 
species which is determined by the Secretary (In-
terior), ... , to be critical. 16 USC §1536 
(emphasis added) . 
Second, the legislative history of the Act in both the 
Senate and the House mandate a "strict compliance" test for §7 
'actions: 
:The Senate Report on the 1973 ESA states: 
All agencies, departments and other instrumentali-
ties of the Fed. Gov. are directed to cooperate 
in the implementation of the goals of this Act. 
Each agency shall, inter alia, take steps to "in-
sure that actions authorized, funded or carried 
out" by it do not jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any such species or result in destruc-
tion of its habitat. 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Adm News, 93d Cong., lst Sess., 2989, 2997 (1973) 
(emphasis added) . 
·The House Report on §7 states: 
I 
il 
This subsection ... requires that [all] agencies 
take the necessary action that will not jeopardize 
the continued existence of endangered species or 
result in the destruction of critical habitat of 
those species ... [F]or example, the Director of 
the Park Service would be required to conform the 
practices of his agency to the need for protecting 
the rapidly dwindling stock of grizzly bears within 
Yellowstone Park. H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, 93d Cong., 
lst Sess., 14 (1973) (emphasis added). 
,., 
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Representative Dingell, one of the primary supporters 
of the Act, further explained §7 by citing practice bombing 
activities of the United States Air Force which threatened the 
Texas wintering grounds of the endangered Whooping Cranes: 
Under existing law, the Secretary of Defense has 
some discretion as to whether or not he will take 
the necessary action to see that this threat dis-
appears ... [O]nce the bill is enacted, he or any 
subsequent Secretary of Defense would be required 
to take the proper steps (emphasis added). 
A fair reading of the language and history of §7 thus 
requires a standard of "strict compliance" rather than a test 
of "good faith effort" for all federal agencies. The Department 
of the Interior has supported this conclusion. As stated on 
i: page 2 of the letter from Secretary Reed to Professor Plater: 
"Given all responsibility to implement the Act 
and the biological expertise within the F.W.S., we 
expect our biological opinions to be given great 
weight in a Federal agency's decision making. The 
expert opinions of F.W.S. biologists will be part of 
the administrative record before each federal agency. 
It then becomes the responsibility of the implemen-
ting Federal agency to decide for itself if it has 
taken all actions necessary to insure that t.he 
continued existence of an endangered or threatened 
species will not be jeopardized or critical habitat 
of S\I.Ch species modified or destroyed." (emphasis 
added). 
Reasonable good faith efforts to comply with the Endan- i 
gered Species Act were clearly not intended by Congress as 
ii establishing the standard for compliance, nor were they contem-
il II 
H 
'I 
:I 
n 
Ji 
plated by the courts which have interpreted that statute thus 
far. To so hold would emasculate the Endangered Species Act 
' and render its provisions meaningless. 
ll 
Nor does the arbitrary and capricious test insulate 
TVA from compliance with the Act, as defendants argue, (TVA Brief, 
20). The standard of judicial review is compliance, not some 
agency interpretation of "reasonableness." NWF v. Coleman, 
F. 2d (5th Cir. 25, 1976) slip opinion at 2569-70, states: 
"The federal cgency must determine whether it 
has taken all necessary action to insure that its 
actions will not jeopardize the continued existence 
of an endangered species or destroy or modify 
habitat. Once that decision is made it 
is then subject to judicial review to ascertain 
whether 'the decision was based on a consideration 
of the relevant factors and whether there has been 
a clear error of judgment.'" (Emphasis added.) 
13 
The agency, in other words, must comply with the Act 
by insuring that no violation will occur. The circumscribed 
judicial review standard applies only where agencies determine 
that there will be no jeopardy, destruction or modification. In 
i the present case TVA admits that the critical habitat will be 
') 
\' destroyed or adversely modified, admits the possibility that the 
darter will be eliminated in the Tellico reservoir, and the 
Department of Interior's findings support such conclusions in 
terms of the statute. Reasonable transplant efforts do not insu-
late the agency from the Act or excuse a violation of the 
statutory terms. 
,, 
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III. Further Authority for Issuance of Injunction 
1. U. S. Supreme Court Holdings in Cases of Statutory Violation 
Establish That an Tnj'linction Should Tssue in This Case. 
An equity court has discretion in its granting of an 
injunction, but where a violation of a Congressional statute is 
involved, the courts balance the equities differently than in 
,' private litigation. In private litigation, equitable discretion 
' 
is based upon findings that plaintiffs are likely to succeed 
on the merits (at preliminary injunction hearings), that irrepar-
able harm will result to plaintiffs, that damages cannot adequately 
;: compensate for the injury, etc. But this Court is not bound by 
li 
:! 
equity standards from private litigation when giving effect to 
, public policy declared by Congress. Shafer v. U.S., 229 F.2d 124 
(5th Cir. 1956) cert. denied 351 U.S. 931 (1956). "Arguments 
taken from whole cloth from prior equity practice in private 
controversies may not suit the statutory remedy that Congress has 
made available." Wirtz v. Harper Buffing Machine Co., 280 F.Supp. 
376, 379 (D. Conn. 1968). The court's discretion 
"must be exercised in light of the large objectives 
of the Act. For the standards of the public. interest, 
not the requirements of private litigation, measure 
the propriety and need for injunctive relief in 
these cases. That discretion should reflect an 
acute awareness of the Congressional [policy]." 
HechtCo. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944). 
The standard that does apply is found in Hecht Co. v. 
, Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), relied upon by defendants. TVA 
Brief at 4. In that case the Supreme Court found that an injunc-
tion was not required against violations of a price control act, 
because the defendant would fully comply and the law be fully 
, enforced without an injunction. The "courts are given jurisdiction 
~~.i I 
to issue whatever order to enforce compliance is proper in the 
)) 
I' f :1 circumstances o each particular case. " Hecht indicates 
li 
':! that where full voluntary compliance "would be as practically 
effective as the issuance of an injunction . . " an injunction 
II 
:·need not issue. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 328, 329 [Emphasis added.] 
The discretion of the court is to tailor the remedy to assure 
, compliance with the Act, not to excuse the violation. In this 
i.l 
case, TVA has clearly indicated that it will not comply with the 
15 
Act by ceasing the reservoir operations that violate the Act, 
[! 
ij unless an injunction issues. The Supreme Court standard applies 
I\ to this case and the injunction should issue. \) 
2,3. 
"[C]ourt and agency are not to be regarded as 
wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities 
of justice, each acting in the performance of its 
prescribed statutory duty without regard to the 
appropriate function of the other in securing the 
plainly indicated objects of the statute. Court 
and agency are the means adopted to attain the 
prescribed end, and so far as their duties are 
defined by the words of the statute, those words 
should be construed so as to attain that end through 
co-ordinated action." 321 U.S. at 330. 
the Congressional 
an injunction. 
4. Other federal cases indicate that a violation of Con ress-
ional statute·requires an injunction to en orce compliance. 
In Akers v. Resor, 339 F.Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), 
Judge Brown found that a Corps project on the Obion and Forked 
Deer Rivers violated mitigation requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 662 
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and NEPA, stating: 
We further conclude that the action by the 
Corps must, under 5 USCA § 706, be enjoined if it 
is arbitrary, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law or failed to meet procedural requirements 
of the statutes. Id.at 1380 (Emphasis added). 
The project was enjoined without weighing the public equities. 
Defendants cite Sierra Club v. Calloway (Wallisville 
~"'"' 
1:Dam) 499 F. 2d 982 (5th Cir. · 1974), for the proposition that @ 
:i 
·,: 
·, injunction should not issue where a project is underway. That 
: case supports plaintiffs' position, however, for though work was 
72% complete, the Court reviewed the percentage of completion 
only to determine whether the Wallisville project was a fre.e-
standing unit of the larger Trinity River Project under NEPA, 
:; and enjoined the project solely because of a violation without 
11 weighing the investment. 499 F.2d 982, at 988,994. 
'1: 
Other federal cases reflect the same standard of 
limited equitable discretion in enjoining statutory violations 
in appropriations acts, Buscaglia v. U.S., 145 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 
l 
I 
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1945) cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792; price controls, Hecht, supra, 
'and Henderson v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 1943); civil 
rights acts, .central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation 
Front, 303 F.Supp. 894, 901 (1969) (enjoining disruption of 
1
' church services) ; and securities acts, SEC v. Advance Growth 
Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972). In the last case 
the Court permanently enjoined the violation, citing Hecht, 
\i 
among others, and stating: 
[The equity] power must also be exercised in 
harmony with the overall objectives of the legis-
lative scheme, and courts should be alert to provide 
appropriate remedies for the effectuation of the 
declared national policy. Otherwise, that policy 
may be frustrated by judicial inaction . 
. . . It is, then, the public interest enunciated 
in the legislation which serves as the criterion for 
the proper exercise of equity power. 
Although injunctive relief is never automatic upon 
the showing of a violation of the Act or regulations 
(see Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra), we should not 
hesitate to reverse an order denying such relief 
when it is evident that the trial court's discre-
tion has not been exercised to effectuate the 
manifest objectives of the specific legislation 
involved. 
5. A remand to Con ress via Q. in· unction is 
1r sition of pu lie works Violations of an Act 
!' 
!, 
I' 
As noted in plaintiff's Trial Brief, at 14-15, there 
11 is an established line of precedent for enjoining a statutory 
,, 
violation thereby transferring the legislative balancing problem 
to Congress for full debate and possible statutory exemption. 
Upon remand to Congress, the Alaska pipeline was exempted from 
r provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act and NEPA, the San Antonio 
freeway from the highway acts and NEPA, and in other cases 
Congress decided not to exempt the project, as in the Cross 
' ,, i! Florida Barge Canal. 
d 
Currently, Congress is debating an exemption! 
' 
' jl 
II 
:1 
i 
to the Forest Service Act after remand from an injunction issued 
i in the Monongahela Forest case, Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 
' 367 F.Supp. 422 (N.D. W.Va. 1973). 
ii 
Two points deserve brief mention: First, though 
defendant argues that injunctions should issue only where 
modifications are readily available and compliance easy, the 
'i 17 
cases noted involved dramatic changes in agency plans. The 
pipeline injunction, for example, potentially required rerouting 
the pipeline a thousand miles overland. over the Canadian Arctic 
shield instead of to shipping points in southern Alaska. In 
any case, defendant is hardly in a position to raise such 
! 
ii equities since TVA has steadfastly refused to consider modification 
I! 
lj !:. 
il II 
:l 
:[ 
of the Project to conform to the Act, despite the fact that it 
knew of the statutory prohibition and modifications and altera-
tions of the Project are thoroughly possible. Second, in two 
of the cases (pipeline right of way and Forest Service Act 
violations) no Congressional policy had been declared, yet 
injunctions were issued in all cases without balancing the public 
and private investment. Violations were enjoined despite the 
,! fact that several billion dollars were at stake, and the question 1 
was shifted to Congress to resolve. The doctrine of judicial 
remands to legislatures by injunctions has been noted by legal 
commentators as specially relevant where, as in this case, 
agency actions in violation of law are irrevocable for the future. 
See Professor Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment, 118-119, 
152, 176-211 (1971) covering both state and federal cases. 
Consideration of a project's percentage of completion 
and investment (as plaintiffs' brief notes at 16, 19-20), unnecess 
arily opens up a balancing question that is difficult to define, 
;: much less to decide. In weighing the public interest when 
statutory violations are involved, the court puts itself in the 
position of weighing not only the amount of resources unrecover-
able in a project, but also the value and weight of Congressional 
policy, the value and weight of a specific compliance, long-term 
and short-term public values (both quantifiable and unquantifiable) 
i 
i 
including ecology, etc. This is a far cry from the.traditional I 
l 
! judicial role in litigation between private parties; it is 
precisely the kind of decision traditionally made by legislatures. 
\ 
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But even if the Court decides to enter into this 
difficult arena, two further points remain: If the Court reviews l · 
, the unrecoverable public expenditure question, TVA has admitted 
\I 
I 
., 
1 that the $80 million figure is a significant overstatement of the 
loss. Further, though plaintiffs' expert did not audit defendant's 
l 
accounts to determine exact amounts, the amount lost to the public~ 
far less than the amount that would potentially be written off 
! on TVA's books, a maximum of $30 million or so. Offsetting that 
loss, without even quantifying preserved public values like 
agriculture and recreation, TVA has admitted that $20 million 
remain to be spent and would be largely saved in the event of 
an injunction. Plaintiffs do not believe that it would serve 
a useful purpose to reopen all the conflicting alternative 
public values reviewed in the prior Tellico litigation. The 
prior record is known to the Court and for present purposes 
simply establishes the fact that there are offsetting public 
values. 
Second, the Calloway case cited by defenqant demonstrates 
1 the principle of judicial restraint in entering the legislative 
11 balancing process. Despite the fact of 72% completion of that 
•I 
project, the court refrained from the weighing of policy, 
dollars and public values, and instead simply enforced the statute 
1 as written. 499 F.2d 982, 994. 
7. The Administrative Procedure Act compels issuance of an 
injunction. 
, As Judge Brown noted in Akers v. Reser, § 4 above, 
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act requires judicial 
enforcement of federal law. 
Section 706 states: 
... The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be -
19 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accorda~ce 
with law 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; 
(D) without observance of procedure re-
quired by law. [Emphasis added]. 
The U. S. Supreme Court interpreted this language in 
the Overton Park case "In all cases agency action must be set 
aside if the action was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' or if the 
action failed to meet statutory, procedural or constitutional 
'; requirements." 401 U.S. 402, 413-414 (1973) [Emphasis added]. 
Where a statute is substantive rather than procedural it would 
appear that compliance is required even more. 
There is a presumption in favor of enforcement of the Act, 
and against the party seeking to continue a violationof the 
Act. 
As noted in the Supplementary Brief at 1-2, there 
a 
,, should be/ presumption that once a violation of Congressional 
!' 
statute and policy is proved, it must be enjoined. If an injunc-
tion does not issue in the face of a violation, § 7 and the Act's 
q 
" citizen enforcement provisions would both be rendered nugatory.' 
Rather, in the absence of constitutional bars, courts should 
give effect to Congressional actions. 
20 
IV. In Brief Conclusion. 
:i This litigation has required much time and patient 
analysis by the Court, in addressing a new and complicated area 
of the law. Plaintiffs would be pleased to present any .further 
oral argument or written exposition if such would be useful to 
the Court, but otherwise believe that the case is ready for de-
cision in light of the extensive record developed to date and 
the defendant's continuing daily alteration of the Little Tennessee 
Valley. 
This case presents clear violations of a novel 
Congressional statute. In determining the violation and the 
remedy, plaintiffs ask that the Court enforce the law as written, , 
leaving it to Congress to review; debate and decide the counter-
vailing issues of policy, public values and economics if Congress 
so wishes. 
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